A study on the Independence of Intelligence Quotient from Rationality Quotient Among Students of Humanities and Basic Sciences

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 M.A Students at Dep of Education & Psychology, Yasouj University

2 Assistant Professor at Dep of Education & Psychology, Yasouj University (Corresponding Author)

3 Assistant Professor at Dep of Education & Psychology, Yasouj University

Abstract

Introduction
1970s social scientists widely accepted two ideas about human nature. First, people are generally rational and their thinking is normally sound. Second, emotions such as fear, affection, and hatred explain most of the occasions on which people become irrational. Our study challenged both of these assumptions without discussing them directly. From 1970s to 2000s, Kanehman and Tversky analyzed systematic errors in thinking of normal people, and the present researchers traced these errors to the operation of the machinery of cognition rather than to the corruption of thought by emotions. Kanehman and Tversky showed that the aforementioned assumptions were actually wrong and intelligent people may be susceptible to irrationality too; therefore, intelligent people often make irrational decisions and use their intuitions more than reasoning to solve problems. Naturally, emotions are provoked immediately and have more power than the intellect. Therefore, there are two systems in the mind. System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control. System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration (Kahneman, 2011). System 1 operates automatically, intuitively, quickly, instinctively, without much effort, and draws conclusions from judgments based on evidence which might not be strong enough, but System 2 is inferential, contemplative, calculating and self-aware, requires effort, is focused, and always slow. Then, students found judgement heuristic quite useful, but sometimes misleading. Therefore, in researchers' viewpoints, man is essentially irrational and cannot always avoid bias. The main objective of this study was to investigate the independence of intelligence quotient (IQ) from rationality quotient (RQ) among students of Humanities and Basic Sciences Students at Yasouj University.
 
 
Research questions


Is there any statistically significant difference in the IQ level of students in different fields of study?


Is there any statistically significant difference in the RQ level of students in different fields of study?


Is there any statistically significant difference between IQ and RQ levels of students in different fields of study?


Is there any statistically significant difference in the average IQ level of students who got high or low RQ scores?


 
Methods
The present researchers benefitted from survey method, and thus the quantitative approach to research for conducting the present study. The statistical population of this study were 137 first semester students of mathematics, physic, psychology, and sociology at Yasouj University in the 2019 academic year. The study sample included 70 students selected through classified sampling. The Comprehensive Assessment of Rational Thinking (CART) scale (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2016) was used to measure the RQ of participants. Furthermore, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WISC-III) was used to measure the IQ of participants. ANOVA and t-test were then run to analyze the obtained data.
Results
There were no statistically significant differences between students of Humanities and Basic sciences in their levels of IQ and RQ. In other words, there was no statistically significant difference between students of mathematics, physics, sociology and psychology in their levels of IQ and RQ. Moreover, participants' IQ level was higher than their RQ level. The results further indicated that participants with high and low IQ scores had the same level of cognitive and intellectual errors and biases. Therefore, it was revealed that IQ was independent from RQ.
Discussion
Are the intelligent necessarily rational? According to the findings of the present study, rationality has no place in the Iranian education system. In other words, the Iranian education system ignores rationality and its importance in students' lives. In addition, the Iranian education system is an elite system based on which logical-mathematical intelligence is considered as the most important criterion for assessing students' cognitive ability. This is clearly reflected in the principles and practices of the National Elite Foundation. Indeed, if the Iranian education system is to teach Iranian students something which has not yet been taught, it is rationality. Based on the findings of the present study, the country's curriculum developers should replace the Platonic-Spencer imitative question "Which type of knowledge is more valuable?" with the more critical questions "Should the concept of education be based on intelligence or rationality?

 

Keywords

References

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History

  • Receive Date: 10 March 2020
  • Revise Date: 09 August 2020
  • Accept Date: 18 August 2020

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